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XVII. The British Fleet 
Exchange of Notes Bet,veen the Secretary of State and 
the British Ambassador 
(Dept. of State Bulletin, 'r ol. III: No. 63, September 7, 1940) 
On Au-gust 29, 1940, the Secretary of State, tl1e 
Honorable Cordell Hull, sent the following com-
munication to the British Ambassador, the Right 
Honorable tl1e Marqtless of Lothian: 
"The Priine ~finister of Great Britain is reported to have 
stated on June 4, 1940, to Parlia1nent in effect that if during 
the course of the present war in which Great Britain and 
the British Common,vealth are engaged the waters sur-
rounding the British Isles should become untenable for 
British ships of war, the British Fleet would in no event 
be surrendered or sunk but 'vould be sent overseas for the 
defense of other parts of the Empire. 
"The Government of the United States would respectfully 
inquire whether the foregoing statement represents the set-
tled policy of the British Government. 
C. H. 
"DEPART::'ttEXT OF STATE, 
"lV ashington, August ~9, 1940." 
The Britisl1 Ambassador replied on September 
2, 1940, as follo,vs : 
"In his A~'de-11! enuJi,·e of August 29th, 1940, the Secretary 
of State enquired whether the Prilne l\Iinister's statement 
in Parliament on J nne 4th, 1940, regarding the intention 
of His l\fajesty's Governn1ent in the United I\:ingdo1n never 
to surrender or sink the British Fleet in the event of the 
''Taters surrounding the British Isles becon1ing untenable 
for His l\Iajesty's Ships 'represents the settled policy of 
His )lajesty's Gover1unent'. 
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"His l\1ajesty's Ambassador is instructed by the Prime 
Minister to inform 1\Ir. Secretary Hull that this statement 
certainly does represent the settled policy of His Majesty's 
Government. Mr. Churchill must however observe that 
these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern 
the German fleet or what is left of it than the British Fleet. 
"BRITISH El\iBASSY' 
"'VASHINGTON, D. c., 
"September f3nd, 1940." 
L. 
